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We experimentally investigate the existence of the disposition effect and diminishing 
sensitivity as its potential cause. Our approach includes three key characteristics: (i) An 
environment closely resembling actual stock markets; (ii) Individual-specific reference 
prices; (iii) A direct test of diminishing sensitivity as a cause of the disposition effect. 
We find strong support for the existence of the disposition effect as an independent 
hypothesis. This is an improvement over previous studies, which tested this hypothesis 
only jointly with others. Our results also strongly point to diminishing sensitivity, of the 
type postulated by prospect theory, being a source of the disposition effect. 
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The purpose of this paper is to test the existence and causes of the disposition effect. 
Empirical evidence indicates that individual investors exhibit a greater propensity to 
realize gains than to realize losses, thereby causing them to incur excessive losses. 
Numerous informal “investing advice” books have been written on how to avoid the 
trap of being unable to cut one’s losses early. Such informal publications are based 
mostly on casual observations and often themselves suffer from representativeness 
biases. In this paper we attempt to carefully examine the disposition effect in an 
experimental setting, in order to discover how psychologically difficult it really is for 
human traders to sell stocks at a loss, and to shed some light on the underlying causes of 
that difficulty. 
There are two basic strands of extant research on this topic. The first one involves 
empirical investigations of real-world financial transaction data, while the second 
consists of laboratory experiments. Papers in the first strand analyze data from various 
securities markets around the world. Some representative empirical work, all of which 
confirms the existence of the disposition effect in various markets, includes: Odean 
(1998) – U.S. stock market; Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) – Finnish stock market; 
Coval and Shumway (2005) – The Chicago Board of Trade; Shumway and Wu (2006) – 
Shanghai stock market; Fogel and Berry (2006) – 176 members of the American 
Association of Individual Investors; Misumi at al. (2007) – Tokyo Stock Exchange; and 
Choe and Eom (2009) – South Korean futures index market.1 Concerning the second 
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 Choe and Eom (2009) find in addition that individual investors are much more susceptible to the 
disposition effect than institutional or foreign investors. 
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strand of literature, the disposition effect has also been demonstrated in laboratory 
experiments conducted mainly on a university students in various locations, including: 
Weber and Camerer (1998) – Germany; Chui (2001) – Macau; Kirchler et al. (2005) – 
Austria; Rubaltelli et al. (2005) – Italy; Vlcek and Wang (2007) – Switzerland; and 
Shiroshita (2009) – Japan. 
Empirical analyses of the disposition effect are valuable, since they directly test for 
the existence of the effect in real-world financial markets. Experimental research, on the 
other hand, while it cannot guarantee external validity, has the undisputed merit of 
allowing for a strict control over, and accurate design of, the environment in which 
stocks are traded. On top of that, individual investor information, which is vitally 
important yet difficult or impossible to obtain in empirical research, can be acquired 
relatively easily in experimental studies. In our case, this information includes 
individual-specific reference points, individual degrees of diminishing sensitivity, and 
the personal and demographic attributes of subjects. Economic experiments, besides 
offering another avenue to test for the existence of the disposition effect, thus also 
permit an opportunity to investigate the effect’s potential causes. 
In order to show why this is important, observe that there exist a multitude of 
candidate explanations for the apparent prevalence of the disposition effect. These 
include: 
(1) The shape of the value function from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect 
theory, which implies that agents are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk 
loving in the domain of losses. In this paper, we refer to this phenomenon simply 
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as “diminishing sensitivity”. 
(2) Belief in reversion to the mean: If investors believe that stocks trading at a loss 
will rebound in the future with high enough probability, then holding on to such 
stocks might be optimal. 
(3) Portfolio rebalancing: Investors might wish to maintain a constant cash value of 
certain stocks in their portfolios. This would lead them to rationally hold on to, 
or perhaps buy still more of, losing stocks. 
(4) Transaction costs: All else equal, selling losing stocks entails higher per-unit 
transaction costs. This, in turn, implies that holding on to them is the smart thing 
to do. 
(5) Psychologically-motivated reasons, such as mental accounting, regret aversion, 
and self-control (Shefrin and Statman (1985)). 
(6) Tax reasons: Although early research on the disposition effect (Shefrin and 
Statman (1985), Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), Odean (1998)), following 
Constantinides’ (1984) exposition of a rational loss realization model, pointed to 
tax-related issues as a possible cause, tax exemption rules associated with capital 
losses would seem to preclude a tax-motivated disposition effect. 
Odean (1998) conjectured that diminishing sensitivity might bring about the 
disposition effect. While demonstrating the effect’s existence in a large data sample, he 
excluded a number of other factors as its possible sources. In particular, Odean’s (1998) 
results do not support the trading costs hypothesis, which is shown to be inconsistent 
with the disposition effect; investors in his sample sell winners more frequently than 
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they sell losers, regardless of transaction costs. Also, by eliminating from his analyses 
trades that might have been motivated by a desire to rebalance, he effectively controlled 
for portfolio rebalancing. Odean (1998), while initially reluctant to reject belief in mean 
reversion as a potential cause of the disposition effect, refers later to his complementary 
paper based on the same sample of investors (Odean (1999)). In that paper he finds that 
the investors tend to buy stocks that have outperformed the market in the past, whereas 
a belief in mean reversion would imply the exact opposite. 
In a related study, an experiment by Weber and Camerer (1998) finds that 
participants are significantly more inclined to buy stocks trading at a loss as opposed to 
those trading at a gain. The authors attribute these findings to prospect theory, yet do not 
exclude belief in mean reversion or, more generally, the misperception of stochastic 
processes, as probable reasons for the effect. 
It has long been suspected that the convexity of prospect theory’s value function in 
the domain of losses might account for the disposition effect. This suspicion, however, 
has itself come to be questioned recently. Kaustia (2010) parameterizes cumulative 
prospect theory’s S-shaped value function (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)) to show that 
propensity to sell is highest at the reference point (purchase price) and declines when 
either gains or losses inflate. Oddly enough, the model predicts that in most cases 
holding any stock is more beneficial than selling. On the other hand, Kaustia (2010) 
finds empirically, using Finnish transaction data, that the propensity to sell a stock does 
not decline as paper gains or losses increase, but rather is increasing or constant in the 
domain of gains and insensitive to returns in the domain of losses. In other words, there 
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is a discontinuity (a “jump”) in investors’ attitudes towards selling exactly at a point 
where capital gains are zero. Given this evidence, he concludes that the S-shaped value 
function cannot predict the pattern of realized returns found in the data and hence that 
the disposition effect is unlikely to be driven by prospect theory preferences. 
Barberis and Xiong (2009) study theoretically the trading behavior of an investor 
with prospect theory preferences and conclude (in the first part of their study) that for a 
significant range of parameter values, prospect theory predicts investors will be more 
inclined to sell stocks with losses than to sell stocks with gains – exactly opposite to 
what the disposition effect leads to.
2
  
Both Barberis and Xiong (2009) as well as Kaustia (2010) employ a carefully 
calibrated prospect theory-type value function and show that it does NOT lead to the 
disposition effect. This finding sent a shockwave throughout the behavioral finance 
community, spurring whole new streams of research in the area. 
One alternative disposition effect explanation that has surfaced recently is 
realization utility theory. The actions of selling and buying stocks result in changes in 
the internal constitution of an investor’s wealth, NOT in changes in the investor’s 
overall wealth level. Hence, it is problematic that the mere act of stock trading, in and of 
itself, should be considered as an event capable of generating any extra utility.  
Both of the two studies cited above make clear distinctions between the evaluation 
period for changes in an investor’s wealth/utility levels and the stock trading time 
intervals. Barberis and Xiong (2009), after first modeling a “traditional” wealth-level 
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 Hens and Vlcek (2011) derive an analogous result. 
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utility-maximizing investor and concluding that such an investor would not be prone to 
the disposition effect, proceed with a simulation exercise based on the premise that any 
act of buying or selling stocks generates a prospect theory-type “utility surge” and 
report significant disposition effect incidence as a result. Barberis and Xiong (2012) 
term this type of utility function “realization utility” and propose a linear specification, 
on which they subsequently base their theoretical and computational modeling exercise. 
In a related study, Henderson (2012) utilizes a Tversky-Kahneman (1992) S-shaped 
value function to solve for an asset-liquidation optimization problem of a realization 
utility investor. Her model predicts that disposition effect becomes more pronounced as 
convexity of the value function in the loss domain increases. 
Importantly, the prevalence of the disposition effect is not extreme in Henderson 
(2012) – investors do sell at a loss voluntarily. The predictions of her model are thus 
closer to (nonetheless, still an order of magnitude higher than) observed empirical and 
experimental results on the intensity of the disposition effect. And her predictions are 
more accurate than those stemming from several competing theories, which are capable 
of producing only a very strong version of the disposition effect wherein investors never 
voluntarily realize losses. 
The theory of realization utility has also been experimentally validated by Frydman 
et al. (2012) with an fMRI study. They report that ventral striatum exhibits a positive 
response when subjects realize capital gains. 
The theory of realization utility is not the only recently debated candidate for 
explaining the disposition effect. Meng (2012) focuses on the prospect theory reference 
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point and shows with a simulation exercise similar to Barberis’ and Xiong’s (2009) that 
the disposition effect obtains readily once we redefine the reference point by a rationally 
expected return rate (above the riskless interest rate) rather than by a status quo level. 
On the other hand, Li and Yang (2013) build a general equilibrium model to 
endogenously solve for the risky asset return rate. Again, using a Tversky-Kahneman 
(1992) value function, they find that diminishing sensitivity does predict a disposition 
effect. 
Summarizing recent research efforts aimed at explaining the disposition effect with 
prospect theory-related arguments, we recognize two distinct lines of reasoning. The 
first line focuses on the effects of the kink at the reference point of the value function, 
associated with loss aversion. In this case, prospect theory is found to explain the 
disposition effect in Meng (2012) (conditional on the reference point being sufficiently 
high above the risk-free rate), as well as in Barberis and Xiong (2012) (in which the 
effect is caused by the realization utility function). The second line of reasoning 
emphasizes diminishing sensitivity – the convexity of the value function in the domain 
of losses. In this case as well, prospect theory is found to be a persuasive explanation 
for the disposition effect, be it through the introduction of realization utility in 
Henderson (2012), or in the stylized extension of a general equilibrium model in Li and 
Yang (2013). 
This paper attempts to examine whether diminishing sensitivity can explain the 
disposition effect without resorting to any specific theory. Such an attempt has been a 
longstanding challenge ever since the seminal paper by Shefrin and Statman (1985). 
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Our approach has three key characteristics. First, we use data generated through an 
experiment designed to mimic as closely as possible a real-world security market – our 
data is thus very similar to actual stock market data. The simulated market in our 
experiment lasts for four weeks. It is open for four and a half hours each trading day – 
exactly like the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Our market is open in the evening hours 
to facilitate frequent trading. We use real-world historical price data for 10 stocks from 
the TSE, edited from tick data so that the prices are updated every two minutes.
3
 
Participants in our experimental market may trade during any time the market remains 
open. Remuneration for participating in the experiment is proportional to the earnings 
(or losses) they acquire through trading. Thus we may assert that any results obtained 
through the experiment mimic closely those of a real world stock market. 
Second, our method directly tests whether or not diminishing sensitivity leads to the 
disposition effect. We do this by eliciting the degree to which subjects are prone to 
display diminishing sensitivity, and correlating this with the strength of the disposition 
effect they exhibit in trading. To this end, we perform supplemental experiments to 
measure our subjects’ degrees of risk aversion in the domains of gains and losses. This 
method allows a more general inquiry into the potential causal relation between 
diminishing sensitivity and the disposition effect. Without the need to rely on a 
particular theory, our method offers a direct test of the hypothesis that diminishing 
sensitivity causes the disposition effect.  
The third characteristic of our study is related to Odean’s (1998) observation that 
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 This method guarantees that subjects will be able to trade at their desired price. 
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testing for the disposition effect is equivalent to testing a joint hypothesis about the 
disposition effect’s existence and the location of the agents’ reference points. Assuming 
a particular value for the reference price – e.g. first purchase price, last purchase price, 
weighted average purchase price, etc. – has been the standard practice used in empirical 
research on the disposition effect. This practice does constitute a type of robustness 
check of the results obtained, but it ignores the possibility of heterogeneity in reference 
points across investors. To address this problem, we solicit individual participants’ 
reference points using a questionnaire survey, and use the obtained values when 
computing gains and losses. In effect, our method constitutes an independent test for the 
disposition effect, not merely a test of the joint hypothesis described by Odean. 
In addition to the three features outlined above, our setup also allows us to exclude 
both taxes and transaction costs as potential explanations for the disposition effect. 
Our analyses, employing the techniques spelled out above, clearly confirm the 
existence of the disposition effect, and point to diminishing sensitivity as being one of 
its causes. We also examine the potential link between individual time preferences and 
the incidence and strength of the disposition effect and find, contrary to expectations, 
that higher discount rates are associated with a weakening of the disposition effect.  
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. In the next section we describe the 
experimental design and methods. In Section 3, we explain the techniques used to 
analyze the data. In Section 4 we report our main results and robustness checks 
involving subjects’ personal attributes; we also verify that our results remain unaffected 
when alternative values are substituted for individual reference points. Our examination 
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of the relationship between time discounting and the disposition effect is also contained 
in Section 4. We offer conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The main experiment in our design is called the “Stock Trading” experiment, in which 
participants buy and sell shares in a simulated stock market. We also conduct two 
supplemental experiments: the “Insurance Buying” experiment and the “Lottery Selling” 
experiment, which we use to measure participants’ risk aversion in the domains of 
losses and gains. 
 
2.1. Stock Trading Experiment 
2.1.1. Outline of the Experiment 
The “Stock Trading” experiment required its participants to buy and sell shares of 10 
companies in a simulated stock market accessed through the internet. Each participant 
was given an initial endowment of virtual shares and virtual cash with which to trade. 
The market lasted for four weeks, and was open for four hours and thirty minutes every 
day from 18:00 through 22:36 (with a six minute break from 20:00 to 20:06).
4
 
 The stock price data we used is authentic mid-price tick data from the past, edited so 
that it is updated every two minutes.
5
 In this way, we avoid any possible negative 
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 The six minute break replicates the lunchtime break from 11:00 through 12:30 instituted on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
5
 Specifically, we randomly selected ten high-liquidity stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
and for each extracted 33 days worth of tick data from “Nikkei Tick Data”. We subsequently created 
for each of the ten stocks a vector of mid-quotes corresponding to those observed at the mid-quotes 
of 2-minute intervals in the original data file, and used morning period mid-quote data for the 18:00 
through 20:00 experiment trading period, and afternoon mid-quote data for the 20:06 through 22:36 
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auto-correlation issues resulting from the bid-ask spread, which we might have 
encountered if we had used actual execution prices. Subjects in our experiment were 
guaranteed that their trades are going to be carried out exactly at the prices shown on 
their monitors, and that those prices are not in any way affected by their own, nor by 
other subjects’ quantities demanded or quantities supplied.6 Short-selling and negative 
cash positions were not allowed. We performed a simple linear transformation on the 
price data to preclude the possibility of identification of actual stocks by the 
participants. 
 The initial endowment of each participant consisted of 10 shares of each of the ten 
stocks and a cash allotment of 10,000,000p (“points”). Participants had access to a 
transaction panel (Figure 1), where they received information on the present 
composition of their portfolios, stock prices and cash holdings. The panel also allowed 
them to make buy and sell orders, which were immediately executed: for instance, by 
changing the number of shares in the “After Transaction” column and clicking on the 
“Execute Trade” button, a corresponding order is completed. Traders in our experiment 
also had access to graphs representing both past price paths (closing quotes) up to the 
present day, and the same-day price paths, starting from the opening bell until the 
present time.
7
 There were no dividends or transaction costs, nor were there any taxes. 
This differs from real world markets but has the benefit of excluding from our analysis 
the above-mentioned factors as possible explanations for the disposition effect. 
                                                                                                                                                     
trading period.  
6
 Consequently, experiment participants emulate small individual investors facing a highly liquid 
market. 
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2.1.2. Compensation Structure 
Participants received three types of compensation. The first type depended on the 
number of days they logged on to the experiment homepage throughout its duration. In 
addition to ¥30 (The exchange rate was around ¥90 per $1 as of the time this 
experiment was conducted.) for each day a subject logged on, a subject was entitled to a 
bonus payment of a few thousand yen if they accessed the system on at least 18 days.
8
 
The second type of compensation was commensurate with the final portfolio return – 
for each percentage point of the return on a subject’s portfolio, ¥180 were awarded. In 
case of negative returns, the resulting losses were subtracted from bonus payment 
awarded for regular logging on to the experiment homepage described above.
9
 The 
third payment type was a ¥30,000 “winner prize” awarded to the participant whose final 
holdings at the end of the experiment were the highest. This prize was instituted to 
facilitate frequent trading activity and hence to generate enough experiment data. 
Experiments such as ours suffer, due to the inherent funding limits, from the problem of 
providing monetary incentives high enough to mimic real world activities. A chief 
characteristic of our experimental design is participants’ ability to engage in stock 
trading anyplace where they have access to the internet, at the time of their choosing 
during the one month duration of the experiment. This differs substantially from 
majority of economic laboratory experiments. Participants in such experiments are 
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 These bonus payments are: ¥1,800 for logging on between 18 and 22 days, ¥2,600 for logging on 
between 23 and 27 days, and ¥3,600 for logging on 28 days (every day of the experiment). 
9
 Should the resulting yen amount turn out to be negative, relevant subjects were to receive ¥0. 
However, there were no such cases. 
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confined in the laboratory environment and have no choice as to the time and place, in 
which to decide and act. Moreover, constant surveillance by experimenters makes 
neglecting to participate in the experiment very difficult.  Since our experiment 
participants do not need to cope with such unusual and strenuous conditions, it is 
plausible to expect that they might be tempted to slack off on participation. The ¥30,000 
winner prize, whilst being affordable in terms of experimenters’ budget constraints, is 
large enough to serve as an effective trading incentivization device.10 This type of 
incentive scheme, though it might not be an exact imitation of real world conditions, 
does resemble actual stock trading in that it allows for a possibility of quite high returns. 
 
 
2.1.3. Basic Experiment Data 
Participants were recruited (with the assistance of an internet research company) from 
among individual investors with previous stock trading experience, defined as having 
recent history of trading at least once per month on the stock market. The average age of 
the participants was 41.94 years (SD=10.74; For males 41.03, SD＝10.98, for females 
44.38, SD=10.06). Detailed attributes of the experiment participants are summarized in 
Table 1. The most numerous age groups were people in their 30s, followed by 40s, with 
a few participants in their 60s and 70s. Employment income earners comprised about 
half of the pool of subjects. Four of the male participants were self-employed. 
Household income ranged from slightly below 3 million yen to 15 million yen. Finally, 
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 As we report below in section 4.2, this incentive structure resulted in ample trading activity and 
hence, an adequate amount of valid experiment data. 
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the real-world trading frequency reported by subjects was most commonly “roughly 
once a week” or “almost daily”, each of these accounting for over 30% of the total. 
 On January 24th 2010, all the subjects were gathered together at a computer 
laboratory at the Osaka University campus, where the experiment was thoroughly 
explained. On the same day, the supplemental risk aversion estimation experiments 
(detailed below) and the questionnaire survey (designed to elicit individual reference 
points) were conducted. From Monday January 25
th
 2010 through Sunday February 21
st
 
2010, the simulated stock market was open for trading every evening between the hours 
18:00 and 22:36. 
 
2.2. Diminishing Sensitivity Measurement Experiment 
Measurements of individual diminishing sensitivity levels were carried out by means of 
two simple experiments. The “Insurance Buying Experiment” was implemented to 
estimate individual risk aversion levels in the loss domain. The “Lottery Selling 
Experiment” was implemented to estimate risk aversion levels in the gain domain. 
 
2.2.1. Insurance Buying Experiment 
In this experiment, each subject was asked whether they were willing to purchase 
insurance at various prices displayed on the monitor. Given an initial endowment of 
assets, the insurance – if purchased – guarantees a payment equivalent to the value of 
assets in case these are lost or damaged. This design in effect allows the experimenters 
to estimate the degree of a participants’ risk tolerance in the domain of losses. 
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 The details of the experiment are as follows. A subject is first presented with an initial 
endowment of ¥2,000. Then, an amount of potential damage and the probability of its 
occurrence are displayed along with a proposed insurance premium. The subject 
chooses whether to purchase the insurance or to decline it. There are four categories of 
potential damage (¥100, ¥400, ¥1200, ¥2000) while the probabilities of their occurrence 
are set constant at 50%. The insurance premiums (along with corresponding premium 
rates, equal to the premium sum divided by the damage total) are displayed in random 
order. An example screenshot is shown in Figure 2. This procedure is repeated 30 times 
in a row for each category corresponding to the four potential damage totals, starting 
from the lowest ¥100. 
 Thus, each subject goes through 120 yes-or-no queries. After that, the computer 





2.2.2. Lottery Selling Experiment 
Individual levels of risk aversion in the domain of gains were estimated via the “Lottery 
Selling Experiment”. In this experiment the subjects were asked whether they were 
willing to sell a lottery ticket at a proposed price. Each ticket has a 50% chance of 
winning a prize. The prize falls into one of four categories: ¥100, ¥400, ¥1200, ¥2000. A 
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 If a subject had in fact purchased insurance for the randomly chosen query, they were given the 
option to avert any potential damage by actually paying the premium. In the case when they had not 
purchased the insurance, the subject had to pay the amount of damage (in case it occurred), which 
was subtracted from their initial endowment. The endowment was left intact whenever no damage 
actually occurred. Whether the damage in fact occurred or not was selected randomly by the 
computer with independent probability of 50%. 
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participant’s task is to answer “yes” or “no” to 30 choice problems for each of the four 
categories. The procedures as well as settlement of payments are analogous to those 
employed in the “Insurance Buying Experiment”.12 
 
2.3. Questionnaire Survey 
The survey was conducted mainly to elicit reference prices, but we also included 
questions pertaining to subjects’ preferences and demographic attributes. Here, we 
constrain ourselves to the description of our main purpose – identification of individual 
reference points. 
 In the questionnaire, hypothetical stock prices paths for two cases – a rising price 
path and a declining one – spanning 6 discrete time periods are presented. For each 
point in time, hypothetical buy and sell transactions along with resulting positions in the 
stock in question are shown. Furthermore, a 7
th
 period price is shown along with 8 
different ways to calculate paper gains and paper losses for the relevant stock. Subjects 
are then requested to choose a method of calculation closest to their own.
13
 The choices 
available for a reference point are: (1) the first purchase price; (2) FIFO: first-in, 
first-out; (3) the last purchase price; (4) LIFO: last-in, first-out; (5) the highest purchase 
price; (6) the lowest purchase price; (7) weighted average purchase price; (8) weighted 
average purchase price minus average profit/loss for the portion of shares sold in the 
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 Out of 120 choice sub-tasks, one was selected randomly by the computer. If the subject chose to 
sell the lottery ticket in that sub-task, they received an amount of money specified therein. In the 
opposite case – when the subject had chosen to not sell – the computer drew the lottery and 
payments were decided depending upon whether a winning ticket or a losing ticket was drawn. In 
the former case the subject was paid the prize, while in the latter they received nothing. 
13
 There was also an additional item corresponding to a “none of the above” option, where a subject 





3. Method of Analysis 
3.1. Degree of Risk Aversion 
We restrict our explanation here to the case of Insurance Buying Experiment, wherein 
we used computational methods exactly analogous to those used in the Lottery Selling 
Experiment. 
 First, we compute for all experiment participants their individual insurance values. 
When specific insurance policies are ordered starting from the cheapest policy and 
going up in value to the most expensive one, we would expect to observe any given 
subject first choosing “buy” a few times, at some point switching to “not buy”, and then 
continuing to choose “not buy” for the remaining cases. We define “individual insurance 
value” as the average of the two values between which the switch occurs. It is however 
conceivable, and indeed turns out to be the case that, some subjects switch multiple 
times. In these cases, we estimate a LOGIT regression model for the 30 proposed 
insurance prices where we assign a “1” to each “buy” decision and a “0” to each “not 
buy” decision. The individual insurance value is then defined as the one corresponding 
to 0.5 in the regression. 
 The absolute risk aversion (ARA) coefficient for the ith subject is defined and 
calculated according to the following formula due to Cramer et al. (2002). 











                              (1)
 
Here, a is the probability of winning equal to 0.5, z is the damage amount, and pi is the 
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“individual insurance value”. As there are four different z values, we take an arithmetic 




3.2. The Estimation Model 
Estimation of the disposition effect and its potential relationship with diminishing 
sensitivity is performed with a LOGIT analysis. The dependent variable 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is 
defined as follows. For each subject i we first look for all instances (measured in 
two-minute units) in which any trades were recorded. The subscript t then corresponds 
to the ordinal location of a trade, when trades are ordered chronologically. 𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is 
set to 1 whenever a subject i sells a stock j at a time t and to 0 otherwise. The 
independent variable 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is set to 1 whenever a stock j in a subject i’s portfolio is 
trading at a loss at a time t, and to 0 otherwise. The regression model is thus 
Model 1：     𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡, (2) 
where 𝛼 and 𝛽1 are the regression coefficients and 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛽1 will be 
negative if the disposition effect obtains; that is, if the tendency to sell is stronger in the 
domain of gains than it is in the domain of losses. 
 Next, we test for diminishing sensitivity as a potential cause of the disposition effect. 
It is plausible that as the degree of diminishing sensitivity increases, the disposition 
effect becomes stronger. The absolute value of the coefficient 𝛽1 from equation (2) 
would in this case increase with the degree of diminishing sensitivity. The regression 
model in this case is  
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 Four subjects in total appeared to either answer Yes/No randomly, or reverse the “Yes’s” and the 
“No’s”. We exclude these subjects from all regressions. 
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Model 2：𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + (𝛽11 + 𝛽12 ∙ 𝐷𝑆𝑖) ∙ 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
                                  = 𝛼 + 𝛽11 ∙ 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∙ 𝐷𝑆𝑖 ∙ 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡.                        (3) 
We expect 𝛽12  to be negative if diminishing sensitivity is indeed a cause of the 
disposition effect. We use here two alternative variables to represent diminishing 
sensitivity. The first one, DS1, is the degree of risk tolerance (the negative of risk 
aversion) in the domain of losses, which corresponds to a measure of convexity of the 
value function. The second one, DS2, is the risk tolerance degree in the domain of losses 
relative to its counterpart in the domain of gains, defined as risk aversion coefficient in 
the domain of gains minus risk aversion coefficient in the domain of losses. This second 
relative measure of diminishing sensitivity might be a more appropriate one, given that 
the disposition effect itself is essentially a relative measure of the extent to which 
winners are more likely to be sold than losers. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Reference Points 
We use each experiment participant’s individual reference point, estimated from the 
questionnaire survey data outlined above. Table 2 summarizes our findings on the 
reference points: reference points for the domain of gains are in rows, while those for 
the domain of losses are in columns. For instance, the “1” in the left-uppermost cell of 
the table indicates that one person chose the first purchase price as their reference point 
for both the gain and the loss domains. Thus we find most subjects choosing a weighted 
average of purchase prices for their reference points, noting that many of them take into 
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account profits for the portion of shares sold in the interim. We also note that most 
respondents selected the same reference points for both the loss and the gain domains. 
 
4.2. Results of the Stock Trading Experiment 
Throughout 28 days of the experiment and across 49 participants, we recorded a total of 
3,527 sell transactions and 4,005 buy transactions – roughly 153 trades per subject, 5.5 
trades per subject per day. Out of the 10 stocks traded, the most frequently traded stock 
was traded 1,639 times, and the least popular one 430 times, while the corresponding 
figures for remaining eights stocks were between 527 and 839. We observe thus an 
overall abundance of trading activity, with one stock topping all the others in popularity. 
Out of all sell orders, 1,620 (45.9%) were profitable while 1,357 (38.5%) were 
accompanied by losses. The remaining 550 (15.6%) trades were zero-profit transactions. 
For the case of buy orders, 622 (15.58%) additional purchases were recorded in the gain 
domain, and 1,108 (27.7%) additional purchases in the loss domain, while 2,275 
(56.8%) additional purchases were recorded on zero-profit accounts. 
 Final asset value scores, when compared with the initial benchmark of 10,000,000 
points, averaged an approximate 70,000 point loss (SD=34,000), with the highest 
scoring subject winning a profit of some 80,000 points and the biggest loser incurring 
some 88,000 points in losses. 
 
4.3. Results of the Risk Attitudes Measurement Experiment 
The average absolute risk aversion coefficient across all subjects was –0.0014 in the 
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Lottery Selling Experiment and –0.0031 in the Insurance Buying Experiment. Subjects 
thus exhibit apparently risk loving attitudes, on average. This outcome most likely 
originates from small stakes used in the simple lottery tasks employed to estimate risk 
attitudes. 
 When we subtract the risk tolerance coefficient measured in the Lottery Selling 
Experiment from the one measured in the Insurance Buying Experiment, we obtain 
0.00168, which is significant at a 5% level. We conclude therefore that our subjects 
exhibit more risk-loving behavior in the domain of losses as opposed to the domain of 
gains. 
 
4.4. Incidence of the Disposition Effect – LOGIT Regressions 
In Table 3 we present a summary of the LOGIT analysis using the individual-specific 
reference points from the questionnaire survey. The first panel reports pooled results for 
all ten stocks. The “Model 1” section reports estimation results for formula (2). The 
coefficient for the losing-stocks variable LOSS is significantly negative at 1%, revealing 
a tendency to avoid the realization of losses. The “Model 2 (1)” section adds the 
𝐷𝑆1 ∙ 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 as an explanatory variable in the regression. Again, the LOSS coefficient is 
negative at a 1% significance level. Together with the results of “Model 1”, this implies 
reluctance on the part of subjects to get rid of losing stocks, and thereby the existence of 
disposition effect. Furthermore, the coefficient for the 𝐷𝑆1 ∙ 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 variable is also 
negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. For the alternative measure of 
diminishing sensitivity used in “Model 2 (2)”, the coefficient of interest is again 
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negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. These results support the 
hypothesis that diminishing sensitivity is a cause of the disposition effect; the higher the 
degree of diminishing sensitivity, the more reluctant investors are to sell losing stocks. 
With the exception of stock #8, we obtain analogous statistically significant results 
for the LOSS coefficients when we perform the regressions for individual stocks (not 
reported here). Regarding the interaction term with the diminishing sensitivity variable 
DS1, the coefficients are all negative except for stock #8, and significantly negative 
except for stocks #8, #1 and #5. When DS2 is substituted for the diminishing sensitivity 
variable, the interaction term coefficients are negative except for stock #9, and 
significantly negative except for stocks #3 and #9. Hence we conclude that for most 
cases our results are consistent with the disposition effect hypothesis, and that 
diminishing sensitivity is one source of the effect. In other words, these outcomes are 
not driven by the special characteristics of any one stock in subjects’ portfolios, but are 
a prevalent tendency evident throughout the entire stock spectrum. 
 
4.5. Accounting for Participants’ Demographic and Personal Attributes 
We next check whether results reported in the previous section are replicated when we 
take into account participants’ individual demographic and personal traits. The 
particular attributes we include in our analyses are gender, age, household income, and 
stock trading experience. 
 Table 4 summarizes the results. In a nutshell: (1) The disposition effect obtains even 
when individual attributes are accounted for; (2) Cross-term coefficients for the losing 
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stocks term LOSS and both diminishing sensitivity terms DS1 and DS2 are negative and 
statistically significant. Clearly, higher diminishing sensitivity produces a more 
pronounced disposition effect. 
 A look at the control variables tells us that women are less prone to selling losing 
stocks. Also, propensity to sell grows stronger with both age and income, albeit in a 
diminishing manner. Finally, those with more real world trading experience tend to sell 
stocks more frequently. 
 
4.6. Alternative Reference Points 
 In the analyses reported thus far we have used the individual-specific reference points 
elicited from the participants through a carefully tailored questionnaire survey. It is 
prudent to verify whether the results thus obtained are changed when other, arbitrarily 
chosen reference prices are employed. For completeness, we performed this verification 
exercise for all subjects for each of the eight reference points specified above in Section 
2.3, for both “Model 1” and “Model 2”. The findings do not differ much from the main 
results reported above. In Table 5 we show the estimation results for two out of eight 
possible reference prices – weighted average purchase price (WA1), and first-bought 
first-sold (FIFO). These findings corroborate previous empirical studies that report 
robustness of the disposition effect with respect to a variety of assumptions on reference 
points. 
 
4.7. Time Discounting and the Disposition Effect 
25 
 
 The ongoing debate about the relationship between prospect theory and the 
disposition effect needs to address the potential effects of time preferences on investors’ 
reluctance to realize losses. Time preferences – in particular, individual discount rates – 
are likely to influence the timing of trades. Although many intertemporal decision 
making models assume, for tractability and simplicity, no discounting at all, it is 
plausible that individual discount rates could interact with the disposition effect. 
Henderson (2012) conjectures that “the inclusion of time discounting would be likely to 
give an incentive to delay losses further, contributing to an even more pronounced 
disposition effect”. In fact, Barberis and Xiong (2012), show in their model that for a 
strong disposition effect to obtain, sufficiently high time discount rates are required, in 
combination with realization utility. In this section we attempt to supplement these 
theories with an empirical test of the hypothesis that investors with higher time discount 
rates exhibit stronger disposition effects. 
 We elicited participants’ time discount rates using a questionnaire accompanying the 
experiment. In the questionnaire, a subject is presented with a series of binary choice 
tasks, in which they must choose between receiving a payment of ¥10,000 in 90 days 
(option “A”), or a payment of ¥X in 97 days (option “B”). The latter amount X is varied 
from the minimum of ¥9,981 through eight values, increasing gradually to the 
maximum of ¥10,574; these correspond to effective annual rates of return of –10% to 
+300%. Usually, the respondents choose the ¥10,000 option at low interest rates, but as 





 The individual respondents’ discount rates can be inferred by estimating the 
interest rate at which respondents are indifferent between the delayed receipt of ¥X and 
the more immediate receipt of ¥10,000. The present study employed procedures of 
measurement and analysis of time-discount rates similar to those outlined in Kimball, 
Sahm, and Shapiro (2008). We estimated the gross discount rate for each respondent 
according to a lognormal distribution function. This estimation method enabled us to 
obtain the interest rates between which a subject switched his choice from option “A” to 
“B” for each respondent, including those who stuck either to option “A” or to “B” for 
all given choices. We term the time discount rates estimated using this method “TD1.” 
Similarly, in another series of eight binary choices, participants chose between receiving 
¥10,000 in one month, or an amount ¥X ranging from ¥9,500 (for an annual rate of –
5%) through ¥14,000 (for an annual rate of +40%) in 13 months. The discount rates 
corresponding to this task are termed “TD2.” 
 Estimation results for equation (3) with added TD1*LOSS (TD2*LOSS) cross-term 
coefficients are presented in Table 6. Subjects’ individual attributes, such as gender, age 
and income, are added to the regression equations here as control variables. The results 
remain unchanged if we omit these variables. 
 The LOSS coefficients are negative and significant in all cases, confirming the 
incidence of the disposition effect. The coefficients for DS1*LOSS and DS2*LOSS are 
again negative and significant. However, both the TD1 and TD2 cross-term LOSS 
coefficients are significantly positive, denying the intuition that higher time-discount 
                                                   
15
 We excluded from this analysis 3 cases wherein respondents switched multiple times between 
¥10,000 and ¥X. 
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rates lead to fewer instances of selling losers. The fact that the signs of the control 
variables’ coefficients are identical to those in the diminishing sensitivity DS estimates 
reported in Table 4 provides additional credibility to our findings. 
 In Table 7, we report estimation results for the cases in which the DS1*LOSS and 
DS2*LOSS cross-term coefficients are omitted from the estimated formula reported in 
Table 6. In other words, Table 7 presents results for estimation of equation (3) in which 
the DS1 and DS2 data have been replaced with TD1 and TD2. Again, the findings we 
report here include the control variables on the right hand side of the equation, but they 
remain unchanged if we omit them. 
 Our basic results concerning time discounting and the disposition effect remain 
unchanged in this new regression. The LOSS coefficients are significantly negative 
(confirming the existence of the disposition effect), while the cross-term coefficients for 
all combinations of TD1, TD2 and LOSS are significantly positive. The impact of 
control variables remains practically unaltered as well. 
 These findings contradict both Henderson’s (2012) conjecture and Barberis’ and 
Xiong’s (2012) theoretical result that higher individual time-discount rates lead to 
stronger disposition effects. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 The economic experiment reported in this paper adds to a substantial body of work 
on the existence of the disposition effect and its potential causes. While numerous 
experimental studies exist on the topic, the distinguishing feature of our approach is the 
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close similarity of our experimental environment with real-world stock markets. For a 
span of 28 days, participants of our simulated stock market bought and sold shares in 10 
stocks, the prices of which were taken from actual past market data. Participants’ 
remuneration was commensurate with profits and losses incurred from buying and 
selling stocks. On top of that, a winner’s prize was awarded to the most successful 
trader. As a result, we acquired ample trading data, with a total of 7,532 transactions. 
Our experimental environment has the additional merit of allowing us to control for a 
range of conditions. For instance, the absence of taxation and transaction costs 
eliminates the need to consider those effects.
16
 
 The greatest merit of our experiment lies in the fact that we were able to extract two 
additional types of information from our participants. First, we pinpointed each 
participant’s individual reference point using a questionnaire survey we conducted 
before the experiment. This information is impossible to acquire in empirical studies, 
and to the best of our knowledge, no previous experimental studies even attempted to 
acquire it. Accordingly, we succeeded in testing an independent hypothesis about the 
existence of the disposition effect, not merely a joint hypothesis of the disposition effect 
and a particular reference point. 
 Our second finding regards the source of the disposition effect, which we were able 
to assess by measuring participants’ risk aversion in both domains (gains and losses) in 
our two supplementary experiments. We find that diminishing sensitivity is a cause of 
the disposition effect, as the latter becomes stronger whenever either (i) behavior in the 
                                                   
16
 However, we can eliminate neither the “portfolio rebalancing” nor the “regression to the mean” 
arguments as potential causes of the disposition effect, as we were unable to control for these. 
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domain of losses becomes more risk-loving, or (ii) behavior in the domain of losses 
compared to behavior in the domain of gains becomes more risk-loving. 
 Our approach, in contrast to previous studies, also has the merit of being a direct 
examination of diminishing sensitivity as a potential cause of the disposition effect. 
Odean (1998) deduces that diminishing sensitivity brings about the disposition effect in 
an indirect manner. He shows by elimination that alternative explanations do not fully 
account for the disposition effect, which persists even after these factors are taken into 
account. 
 We demonstrate directly with our LOGIT analyses that the disposition effect exists 
and that diminishing sensitivity is one of its causes. This result remains valid even when 
we use a variety of alternative reference points for prices. 
 The debate over whether prospect theory can explain the disposition effect has heated 
up recently. It has been convincingly argued by both Barberis and Xiong (2009) and 
Kaustia (2010) that the traditional economic interpretation of a Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992) value function, wherein the sheer act of stock trading does not lead to changes in 
utility levels as long as consumption remains unchanged, will not generate the 
disposition effect. In contrast, arguments based on prospect theory readily produce the 
disposition effect in a series of recent studies. In Barberis and Xiong (2012) and in 
Henderson (2012), the effect is generated by realization utility. In Li and Yang (2013), a 
prospect theory-based extended general equilibrium model with endogenous returns 
generates the effect. A modification of the value function reference point, which uses 




 The two theoretical studies most closely related to ours, Henderson (2012) and Li and 
Yang (2013), point to diminishing sensitivity as the vital link between prospect theory 
and the disposition effect. In both papers, the larger the degree of diminishing sensitivity, 
the more prominent the disposition effect. This is consistent with our empirical findings, 
though we admit that it was not our intent in this project to verify the validity of either 
of the theories mentioned above. In order to fully validate those theories, it is necessary 
to design experiments based on hypotheses aimed at clearly distinguishing between the 
various theories. This task remains a challenge for further research. 
 We also find, interestingly, that higher individual discount rates do not lead to 
stronger disposition effects; in fact, the opposite appears to be true, a result that negates 
the conjectures of both Henderson (2012) and Barberis and Xiong (2012). However, our 
time discounting analysis is a tentative one, and as such should be regarded with caution. 
In contrast to our elicitation of risk attitudes through a rigorous economic experiment, 
the time discount rates were estimated from participants’ responses to a simple 
questionnaire. On top of that, the discount rates were estimated in the gains domain only. 
Appelt et al. (2011) provide evidence for a lack of consistency in discount rates across 
the gain/loss domains. A more thorough examination of the potential links between time 
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Table 1: Summary of Experiment Participants’ Attributes 
Participants were recruited (with the assistance of an internet research company) from among individual investors 
with previous stock trading experience, defined as having recent history of trading on the stock market at least once 
per month. 
n % n % n %
age_group
20-29 3 8.60% 1 7.70% 4 8.30%
30-39 16 45.70% 4 30.80% 20 41.70%
40-49 9 25.70% 5 38.50% 14 29.20%
50-59 5 14.30% 1 7.70% 6 12.50%
60-69 0 0.00% 2 15.40% 2 4.20%
70- 2 5.70% 0 0.00% 2 4.20%
Total 35 100.00% 13 100.00% 48 100.00%
JOB
civil servant 1 2.90% 0 0.00% 1 2.10%
business executive 2 5.70% 1 7.70% 3 6.30%
administrative staff 1 2.90% 0 0.00% 1 2.10%
office staff 2 5.70% 3 23.10% 5 10.40%
technical staff 10 28.60% 0 0.00% 10 20.80%
sales/customer service 4 11.40% 2 15.40% 6 12.50%
other salaried worker 2 5.70% 0 0.00% 2 4.20%
teacher 1 2.90% 0 0.00% 1 2.10%
medical expert 1 2.90% 0 0.00% 1 2.10%
self-employed 4 11.40% 0 0.00% 4 8.30%
other part-time 2 5.70% 0 0.00% 2 4.20%
homemaker 1 2.90% 4 30.80% 5 10.40%
working homemaker 0 0.00% 2 15.40% 2 4.20%
unemployed 1 2.90% 1 7.70% 2 4.20%
other 3 8.60% 0 0.00% 3 6.30%
Total 35 100.00% 13 100.00% 48 100.00%
INCOME_GROUP (unit: 10,000yen)
<100 1 2.90% 0 0.00% 1 2.10%
100-200 0 0.00% 1 7.70% 1 2.10%
200-300 1 2.90% 0 0.00% 1 2.10%
300-400 3 8.60% 2 15.40% 5 10.40%
400-500 5 14.30% 1 7.70% 6 12.50%
500-600 5 14.30% 3 23.10% 8 16.70%
600-700 5 14.30% 0 0.00% 5 10.40%
700-800 2 5.70% 2 15.40% 4 8.30%
800-900 6 17.10% 0 0.00% 6 12.50%
900-1000 4 11.40% 1 7.70% 5 10.40%
1000-1500 1 2.90% 0 0.00% 1 2.10%
1500- 1 2.90% 3 23.10% 4 8.30%
unknown 1 2.90% 0 0.00% 1 2.10%
Total 35 100.00% 13 100.00% 48 100.00%
FREQ_TRADE (about once in ~)
a month 9 25.70% 0 0.00% 9 18.80%
half a month 2 5.70% 6 46.20% 8 16.70%
a week 11 31.40% 5 38.50% 16 33.30%
daily 13 37.10% 2 15.40% 15 31.30%






Table 2: Questionnaire Survey of Reference Points – Summary of Results 
This table summarizes the results of a questionnaire survey conducted to elicit individual reference points. It reports 
the number of subjects corresponding to each combination of reference points. Each row represents a reference point 
for the domain of gains and each column represents a corresponding reference point for the domain of losses. The 
labels for each reference point are as follows. FIRST: first purchase price; FIFO: first-in first-out; LAST: last 
purchase price; LIFO: last-in first-out; HIGH: highest purchase price; LOW: lowest purchase price; WA1: weighted 
average purchase price; WA2: weighted average purchase price minus average profit/loss for the portion of shares 
sold in the interim time NULL: no response. 
 
FIRST FIFO LAST LIFO LOW WA1 WA2 OTHER NULL TOTAL
FIRST 1 1
FIFO 2 1 3
LAST 2 1 3
LOW 1 1
WA1 1 1 15 1 1 19
WA2 21 21
OTHER 1 1












Table 3: Summary of LOGIT Regressions Using Individual-Specific Reference Points 
This table shows regression results for two models – “Model 1” and “Model 2”. Data for this analysis consists of 
trade records for all the stocks in subjects’ portfolios. The dependent variable SELL takes a value of 1 whenever a sell 
transaction occurs, and 0 otherwise. The variable LOSS is set equal to 1 whenever a stock is trading at a loss and 0 
otherwise. Whether the stock in question is actually trading at a loss is determined via a subject-specific reference 
point elicited through a questionnaire survey. Whenever such determination was not possible, the corresponding data 
was excluded from the analysis. Diminishing sensitivity coefficients DS1 and DS2 used for Model 2 (1) and Model 2 
(2) are defined as DS1 = (–1) * (Degree of Risk Aversion in the Insurance Buying Experiment) and DS2 = (–1) * 
(Degree of Risk Aversion in the Insurance Buying Experiment) – (–1) * (Degree of Risk Aversion in the Lottery 
Selling Experiment), respectively. *** indicates coefficients which are significant at the 1% significance level. 
  Model 1   Model 2 




  coef. z     coef. z     coef. z   
LOSS -0.748  -19.64  *** 
 
-0.528  -10.39  *** 
 
-0.555  -13.10  *** 
DS1･LOSS 
  
   
 
-58.274  -6.23  *** 
   
   
DS2･LOSS 
  
   
   
   
 
-46.192  -9.13  *** 
Constant -1.151  -46.07  *** 
 
-1.151  -46.07  *** 
 
-1.151  -46.07  *** 
Pseudo R
2
 0.02    0.02    0.03  
Number of 
Observations 
19451   19451   19451 
                        
Marginal 
Effects 
                      
LOSS -0.110  -19.91  *** 
 
-0.106  -19.60  *** 
 
-0.106  -19.53  *** 
DS1 
  
   
 
-3.609  -6.23  *** 
   
   





Table 4: Summary of LOGIT Regressions Including Individual Attributes 
This table reports results of regressions for “Model 1” and “Model 2” with experiment subjects’ personal attributes 
added as independent variables. The dependent variable SELL takes a value of 1 whenever a sell transaction occurs, 
and 0 otherwise. The variable LOSS is set equal to 1 whenever a stock is trading at a loss and 0 otherwise. Whether 
the stock in question is actually trading at a loss is determined via a subject-specific reference point elicited through a 
questionnaire survey. Whenever such determination was not possible, the corresponding data was excluded from the 
analysis. FEMALE is a dummy variable equal to 1 for females and 0 for males, AGE is the age variable and INCOME 
is the income variable. FREQ_TRADE_dummy is the dummy variable with values assigned according to subjects’ 
real-world market trading experience. Diminishing sensitivity coefficients DS1 and DS2 used for Model 2 (1) and 
Model 2 (2) are defined as DS1 = (–1) * (Degree of Risk Aversion in the Insurance Buying Experiment) and DS2 = (–
1) * (Degree of Risk Aversion in the Insurance Buying Experiment) – (–1) * (Degree of Risk Aversion in the Lottery 
Selling Experiment), respectively. **, *** indicate coefficients that are significant at the 5% and 1% significance 
level, respectively. 
  Model 1   Model 2 




  coef. z     coef. z     coef. z   
LOSS -0.719  -18.30  *** 
 
-0.608  -11.28  *** 
 
-0.604  -13.68  *** 
DS1･LOSS 
    
-31.804  -2.95  *** 
    
DS2･LOSS 
        
-29.091  -5.36  *** 
FEMALE -0.726  -13.64  *** 
 
-0.660  -11.44  *** 
 
-0.672  -12.55  *** 
AGE(x0.01) 5.164  3.66  *** 
 
4.459  3.12  *** 
 
0.045  3.21  *** 
AGE2(x0.0001) -6.851  -4.81  *** 
 
-6.155  -4.27  *** 
 
-5.975  -4.21  *** 
INCOME(x0.01) -0.127  -10.77  *** 
 
-0.124  -10.46  *** 
 
-0.115  -9.66  *** 
INCOME2(x0.0001) 0.001  11.10  *** 
 
0.001  10.84  *** 
 
0.001  10.14  *** 





once in half a month -0.804  -8.15  *** 
 
-0.827  -8.34  *** 
 
-0.833  -8.44  *** 
once a week -0.454  -6.01  *** 
 
-0.487  -6.39  *** 
 
-0.456  -6.09  *** 
daily -0.011  -0.16     
 
-0.013  -0.20     
 
0.018  0.28     
Constant -0.842  -2.59  ***   -0.693  -2.11  **   -0.813  -2.53  *** 





Number of Observations 19345   19345   19345 
              Model 1   Model 2 




Marginal Effects coef. z     coef. z     coef. z   
LOSS -0.099  -18.61  *** 
 
-0.099  -18.55  *** 
 
-0.098  -18.46  *** 
DS1 
    
-1.880  -2.96  *** 
    
DS2 
        
-1.714  -5.37  *** 
FEMALE -0.100  -13.74  *** 
 
-0.091  -11.50  *** 
 
-0.092  -12.62  *** 
AGE(x0.01) -0.148  -5.58  *** 
 
-0.157  -5.89  *** 
 
-0.130  -4.89  *** 
INCOME(x0.01) -0.016  -10.72  *** 
 
-0.015  -10.39  *** 
 
-0.014  -9.58  *** 





once in half a month -0.111  -8.17  *** 
 
-0.114  -8.36  *** 
 
-0.115  -8.46  *** 
once a week -0.062  -6.02  *** 
 
-0.067  -6.41  *** 
 
-0.063  -6.10  *** 




Table 5: LOGIT Regressions Results Summary under Weighted Average Purchase Price 
WA1 and under the First-Bought First-Sold FIFO Rule as Reference Points 
Panels A and B report regression results for “Model 1” and “Model 2” for the case when individual-specific reference 
points are replaced with the weighted average purchase price and the first-bought first-sold FIFO rule (i.e. shares 
which are purchased first are also sold first) as a reference point, respectively. The distinction between the domain of 
gains and the domain of losses is accordingly revised to reflect this change in the reference point. For details, please 
refer back to Table 3. 
 
Panel A: Weighted Average Purchase Price WA1 
  Model 1   Model 2 
     
(1)   (2) 
 coef. z     coef. z     coef. z   
LOSS -0.792  -21.01  *** 
 
-0.550  -10.87  *** 
 
-0.594  -14.20  *** 
DS1･LOSS      -63.230 -6.83 ***     
DS2･LOSS         -47.883 -9.51 *** 
Constant -1.133  -45.68  *** 
 
-1.133  -45.68  *** 
 
-1.133  -45.68  *** 
Pseudo R
2







        
 
      
 
      
Marginal Effects coef. z     coef. z     coef. z   
LOSS -0.114  -21.34  *** 
 
-0.111  -20.93  *** 
 
-0.112  -20.94  *** 
DS1 
  
   
 
-3.908  -6.82  *** 
   
   
DS2              -2.948  -9.48  *** 
 
Panel B: The First-Bought First-Sold FIFO 
  Model 1   Model 2 
     
(1)   (2) 
 coef. z     coef. z     coef. z   
LOSS -0.794  -20.93  *** 
 
-0.511  -10.10  *** 
 
-0.582  -13.94  *** 
DS1･LOSS    -74.417 -7.94 ***    
DS2･LOSS         -53.295 -10.28 *** 
Constant -1.147  -46.96  *** 
 
-1.147  -46.96  *** 
 
-1.147  -46.96  *** 
Pseudo R
2







        
 
      
 
      
Marginal Effects coef. z     coef. z     coef. z   
LOSS -0.114  -21.25  *** 
 
-0.111  -20.79  *** 
 
-0.113  -20.99  *** 
DS1 
  
   
 
-4.400  -7.92  *** 
   
   





Table 6: Summary of LOGIT Regressions Including the Time Discount Rates TD1 and TD2 
Cross-Terms with LOSS besides the Diminishing Sensitivity and LOSS Cross-Terms. 
This table reports regression results for “Model 2” (equation (3)) with TD1*LOSS and TD2*LOSS cross-term 
coefficients added to the equation. 
 
  Model 2 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  coef. z   coef. z   coef. z   coef. z   
LOSS -0.733  -12.94  *** -0.696  -12.43  *** -0.787  -16.50  *** -0.758  -15.93  *** 
DS1･LOSS -53.751  -4.68  *** -54.319  -4.80  *** 
  
      
DS2･LOSS 
     
   -58.260  -9.17  *** -64.167  -9.78  *** 
TD1･LOSS(x0.01) 0.193  7.56  *** 
  
   0.292  10.41  ***    
TD2･LOSS(x0.01) 
  
   1.306  6.42  *** 
  
   2.307  9.76  *** 
FEMALE -0.561  -9.51  *** -0.607  -10.42  *** -0.555  -10.12  *** -0.601  -11.18  *** 
AGE(x0.01) 2.251  1.55     5.090  3.52  *** 2.069  1.46     5.597  3.96  *** 
AGE2(x0.0001) -3.882  -2.65  *** -6.691  -4.59  *** -3.313  -2.31  ** -6.720  -4.72  *** 
INCOME(x0.01) -0.169  -13.63  *** -0.135  -11.24  *** -0.161  -13.08  *** -0.125  -10.51  *** 
INCOME2(x0.0001) 0.002  14.03  *** 0.001  11.68  *** 0.002  13.68  *** 0.001  11.17  *** 
FREQ_TRADE_dummy  (against “once/month”) (against “once/month”) (against “once/month”) (against “once/month”) 
once in half a month -0.924  -9.21  *** -0.837  -8.41  *** -0.943  -9.47  *** -0.842  -8.51  *** 
once a week -0.708  -9.06  *** -0.515  -6.76  *** -0.673  -8.84  *** -0.451  -6.04  *** 
daily -0.136  -1.98  ** -0.053  -0.80     -0.114  -1.67  * -64.167  0.16     
Constant 0.127  0.38     -0.794  -2.38  ** 0.015  0.04     -1.129  -3.45  *** 
Pseudo R2 0.071  0.066  0.074  0.070  






Table 7: Summary of LOGIT Regressions Including the Time Discount Rates TD1 and TD2 
Cross-Terms with LOSS instead of the Diminishing Sensitivity and LOSS 
Cross-Terms. 
This table reports regression results for “Model 2” (equation (3)) with TD1*LOSS and TD2*LOSS cross-term 
coefficients replacing the DS1*LOSS and DS2*LOSS coefficients. 
 
  Model 2 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  coef. z   coef. z   coef. z   coef. z   
LOSS -0.986 -21.81 *** -0.988 -21.26 *** -0.889  -18.88  *** -0.849  -17.99  *** 
TD1･LOSS(x0.01) 0.0023 10.28 *** 
   
0.156  6.44  ***    
TD2･LOSS(x0.01) 
   
0.01809 9.44 *** 
   
1.010  5.22  *** 
FEMALE 
      
-0.670  -12.32  *** -0.719  -13.45  *** 
AGE(x0.01) 
      
339.530  2.37  ** 6.047  4.22  *** 
AGE2(x0.0001) 
      
-5.027  -3.48  *** -7.656  -5.31  *** 
INCOME(x0.01) 
      
-0.171  -13.77  *** -0.138  -11.50  *** 
INCOME2(x0.0001) 
      
0.002  14.09  *** 0.001  11.84  *** 
FREQ_TRADE_dummy  
  
(against “once/month”) (against “once/month”) 
once in half a month 
      
-0.877  -8.83  *** -0.800  -8.09  *** 
once a week 
      
-0.643  -8.34  *** -0.460  -6.09  *** 
daily 
      
-0.111  -1.63     -0.042  -0.63     
Constant -1.167 -46.36 *** -1.153 -46.06 *** -0.142  -0.43     -1.000  -3.03  *** 
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.027 0.069  0.065  












Figure 1: Screenshot of the Transaction Panel (translated from Japanese) 
The screenshot in the figure above provides information on the present composition of the subjects’ portfolios, stock 
prices and cash holdings. Subjects use it also to order their buy and sell transactions, which are immediately executed. 
For instance, by changing the number of shares in the “AFTER” transaction column and clicking on “TRADE”, a 
corresponding order is completed.  
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Figure 2: Screenshot from the “Insurance Buying Experiment” (edited from Japanese) 
The display for this experiment shows an amount of potential damage with the probability of its occurrence as well as 
an insurance premium offer. The subject chooses either to purchase the insurance (”yes”) or to decline it (”no”). 
